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Fighting Over the Figure of
Gender
Ali Miller*
In an early draft of this Essay, I accidentally typed ―The
Figure of Gender‖ instead of ―The Future of Gender,‖ the
correct title for my remarks at Pace Law School‘s November
2010 Symposium, After Gender?. I have kept this mistaken title
because I think it nicely captures a vexed aspect of ―gender‖ in
international human rights law (IHRL) today—who or what
person is figured (imagined, addressed, elaborated, and
maintained) with the use of the word ―gender‖? My comments
on the panel took their impetus from suggestions about flirting
made by cultural theorist and psychoanalyst Adam Phillips.
Following his lead, I asked in my remarks, if we only flirt with
serious things (madness, death, other people), then mustn‘t we
pay close attention to how, and indeed with whom, we as
advocates and scholars flirt when we flirt with gender?1 Or, as
I describe below in my discussion about advocacy on gender in
human rights legal settings, must we also pay attention to
what happens when we fail to flirt with gender?
In this Essay, I use Phillips‘ concern with the failure to

* Thanks go to the Symposium organizers, especially Darren Rosenblum
for convening the conference, and my co-panelists Elizabeth Emens, Paola
Bergallo, Aminu Gamawa, Dianne Otto, and Ralph Wilde, as well as my
editors at the Pace Law Review. Special thanks are due to Mary Anne Case,
Susana Fried, Amy Kapczynski, Cynthia Rothschild, and Carole Vance for
their careful comments and grounded and principled critiques on earlier
drafts of this Essay, and in particular for their suggestions of additional
resources. Fried and Rothschild, as directly engaged participants in many of
the U.N. events described in this Essay, contributed significantly to the
information as well as the analysis I have developed. While thanks are due
for their input—all concerns over errors in this Essay run back to me.
1. ADAM PHILLIPS, On Flirtation: An Introduction, in ON FLIRTATION, at
xvii (1996). This Essay is drawn from remarks on a panel chaired by
Elizabeth Emens and in preparation for which we exchanged short readings
that could provide the conceptual underpinnings of our discussion. I chose
two excerpts from Adam Phillips to guide my remarks.
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flirt to guide my inquiry into the ways in which contemporary
advocates reify, concretize, and turn gender into a project, a
grant, or a territory with fiercely protected borders. I track an
increasingly painful fault line visible in gender advocacy and
policy at the global level. The fault line divides gender either
into short-hand for attention to ―women‖ deemed a unified,
single category; or gender into shorthand for an aspect of gay
(male), or more recently transgender, identity. Reductive and
mutually exclusionary uses of one of these two versions of
gender abound in advocacy on U.N. policy and programming,
and in the resulting policy, norms, development, and
programming itself.
These uses sit alongside frequently-voiced understandings
of gender as a relational concept, one capturing the operation of
situated rules and practices that constitute a range of
masculine and feminine roles for bodies deemed male and
female. These roles also assign resources and powers in all
spheres of life. Yet despite the intentions of some nongovernmental organization (NGO) advocates and a few U.N.
agency staff to retain the more capacious scope of gender as an
analytic frame attending to relations of power and beliefs
governing the fullest range of persons, my sense is that the
dominant institutional use of gender in the U.N., and among
many advocates, is a flat, binary, and exclusionary one.
Moreover, in this binary, when figured as an attribute of
women, gender has connotations of heterosexuality; when
figured as an aspect of men, gender appears to signal
homosexuality. Recently, however, on the gendered/gay man
side of the institutional gender split one can find references to
―gender identity‖ emerging as a protected aspect of persons. As
used here, ―gender identity‖ flags an aspect of identity linked to
the sense of being male or female. In U.N. advocacy it generally
signals transgender. Notably, it has emerged in IHRL advocacy
on the (homo)sexual orientation side of gender.2

2. For more discussion about the reified phrase SOGI, or sexual
orientation and gender identity, as well as the other exclusions such as
sexually non-conforming women, including lesbians in this bifurcation, see
infra Parts III and IV.
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Moreover, beliefs about gender‘s un-severable link to
sexuality increasingly permeate many deployments of ―gender‖
in programming and advocacy at the U.N. The under-analyzed
assumptions about sexuality, including the naturalization of
expressions of gender non-conformity as always and only
proxies for homosexuality, contribute to the further division of
gendered rights in advocacy and norm building. This Essay will
weave in and around the effects on gender claims of the
presumed links between sexuality and gender, but for now, it is
enough to say that the bifurcation of gender as a term in the
U.N. rights work—parsed as if women identified through
gender analysis must be heterosexual and men who can be
analyzed with regard to gender must be homosexual—
simultaneously relies on, and obscures, the sexual work that
gender is being used to do. And by inviting in only sexuality to
describe gender (and vice versa) our gendered conversations
are both impoverished and oddly regressive.
To explore the question of who is figured in the use of the
term ―gender‖ in contemporary IHRL and to consider the
strategic and social justice-hampering effects of these
assignments, I focus first on evidence of a gender-split within
NGO U.N. rights advocacy, and then on an example of this
embodied schism of gender in a new norm on gender emerging
from within a U.N. human rights treaty body. The effects of the
gender division are mutually reinforcing in vicious/virtuous
circles: NGO perspectives increasingly shape the making and
implementation of international rights standards and policies
at the U.N., while institutional imperatives and politically
dictated channels of work also shape the direction and scope of
gender rights advocacy.
This Essay‘s focus on the fault line of gender will first
follow the evidence of the gender splits on their own terms, and
then dig deeper into the political contexts and conceptual
underpinnings, including ideas about sexuality, that enable
them.
Overall, I am concerned that gender advocates are being
driven farther apart from each other in alliance and discourse
by the institutionalization of the gender fault lines, and that
the resulting policies are weakening the progressive potential
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of gender as an analytic tool which might benefit all.
I. Gender, Gender Territorialization and Some Implications of
the U.N. as Site of Gender Struggle
The conflict over who owns gender—what I call ―gender
territorialization‖—appears in multiple U.N. institutions and
settings, and can have significant effects on the normative
content of developing international human rights law. For
example, if gender-based violence (GBV) is conventionally
understood to be violence directed at women by men, then legal
changes in sexual assault laws that are called for in campaigns
on sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) need not attend to
the rape or sexual assault of men, despite its ubiquity in both
conflict and custodial contexts. GBV laws are left as ―women
specific‖ in their content and application.
This gender split can also have effects on policy and
programming: who is prioritized for participation and funding
in ―gender-sensitive outreach, education and services‖?
(Heterosexual)women, trans persons, gay men? Who is
squeezed out? Ironically, it appears lesbians do not register in
this territorialization of gendered bodies, and normative
masculine and (presumed heterosexual) men are perhaps left
to shift for themselves (perhaps to retain existing power, or to
fail to learn new roles and behaviors?).3 In this framework, the
struggle among subsets of advocates (notably not all groups
associated with gender for example, fall into these ―sects‖) is
exacerbated by the U.N.‘s silo-ing of issues (women‘s rights and
human rights, identity as mandate (race, child, women, etc.)
and this U.N. institutional tracking in turn has effects
narrowing the more capacious and transformative claims
around gender overall.
My examples show two superficially distinct guises of
gender territorialization in the U.N.: in one case, the turf fight
is overt—a subset of advocacy groups representing ―gender as
identity/woman‖ struggle with a subset of groups representing
3. Kate Sheill, Losing out in the Intersections: Lesbians, Human Rights,
Law and Activism, 15 CONTEMP. POLITICS 55, 57–60 (2009).
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―gender as gay or trans identity/male‖ over priority in policy
and funding, primarily in the worlds of health and antiviolence work. In the second case, the tension is discernible in a
deafening silence—the parallel and non-referential advocacy
carried out by the two camps, sometimes in silo-ed fora. These
separate fora operate with agendas which may be understood
as women specific versus human rights general, or race
specific, or have sub-agendas that are understood as LGBT
specific, or reproductive health specific. While specificity is
critical to ensure appropriate tailoring of remedies for rights
violations and services, my concern is that this ―gender
exclusionary‖ version of specificity has moved advocates‘
analysis away from the common structures and forces that
produce the specific gendered effects, and the resulting
exclusionary analysis most definitely blocks strategic coalitions
among the sub-groups facing the common gendered repression.
For example, reproductive health rights discussions focus
on women who have sex with men, and HIV sexual health
agendas sometimes focus on concentrated epidemics in socalled marginalized groups such as MSM and sex workers. It is
interesting to note that women sex workers who sell sex to men
are deemed non-reproductive during those transactions and fall
outside of both conversations. In these silos, some women‘s
groups highlight only the victimization of women and their
abuse by men, in their press for ―gender equality,‖ or stress
only attention to women in the need for education, services,
and other protections from gender-based violence (a conflation
accomplished in part by the replacement of the acronym for
―violence against women‖ with GBV).4 Some of these groups

4. Effectively, heteronormative men are denied ―gender‖ in these
conflations and slides. The category of GBV also often picks up ―violence
against women and children,‖ a switch between gender/sex systems and age
regimes, which is equally, but differently, troubling. The persistence of the
quasi-legal grouping of ―women and children‖ as a meaningful category
(women take care of children? women are like children in lack of rights?) in
programmatic and policy rhetoric remains evident in the U.N. The release of
the Secretary General‘s Global Strategy for Women and Children’s Health
reveals this tendency. See Global Strategy for Women and Children’s Health,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sg/globalstrategy (last visited Nov. 7,
2011). The persistent conflation occurs even as earlier work carefully pointed
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raise concerns about the criminalization of sex for women only
outside of marriage, highlighting criminal prosecutions under
sex-specific discriminatory laws. On the other hand, another
subset of groups focused on ending discrimination or violence
directed at persons because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity (SOGI) focus their ―gender‖ advocacy on
violence directed at gender non-conforming persons (gay men
or transpersons, usually male to female/MTF) or call attention
to the need to decriminalize of same-sex behavior (often
codified as crimes in so-called sodomy laws) in the context of
penalties for sex outside of marriage, including but often not
limited to same-sex sexual behavior. They sometimes but not
often work on issues and agenda items relating to women‘s
reproductive or sexual health.5
Both of these streams of activism and policy-making are
carried out as part of human rights advocacy at the global
level, such as in the U.N. Human Rights Council, or in
meetings with, and reports to, the human rights treaty bodies.

out that health interventions for newborns and young children do not
automatically translate into health benefits for their mothers, and vice versa.
See Who’s got the power: Transforming health systems for women and
children,
U.N.
MILLENIUM
PROJECT,
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/maternalchild-complete.pdf
(last visited Nov. 8, 2011). However, the collapse of women and children into
a single category in the context of violence may have a distinct sexualized
aspect: the ―violence against children‖ that is usually enumerated under the
GBV rubric on closer inspection tends to be sexual abuse. For example, the
old, historic crime of ―trafficking‖ (initially defined in the ―White Slavery
Conventions‖ as the mere movement of persons into prostitution, i.e. ―to
gratify the passions of another‖) encompassed ―women,‖ ―women and girls,‖
and ―women and children‖ at different moments in history. Current antitrafficking projects still often rhetorically start with women but will slide into
talking about women and children, revealing the extent to which women are
understood to be like under-age boys and girls in regard to their incapacity
and the importance of protecting their chastity, and boys are like virginal
girls in that they must be protected against sexual encounters with men, i.e,
homosexual desire. For an introduction to this shifting terrain of legal scope,
see ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING
(2010).
5. Francoise Girard, Negotiating Sexual Rights and Sexual Orientation
at the U.N., in SEX/POLITICS: REPORTS FROM THE FRONT LINES 311, 315-16,
318-19 (Richard Parker, Rosalind Petchesky & Robert Sember eds. 2007),
available at http://www.sxpolitics.org/frontlines/book/index.php.
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I am concerned that the political culture of the advocates plus
the institutional inertia of divided U.N. agendas leads to a
failure of both streams of advocates to reference gender-diverse
claims outside their own body of knowledge; it leads to a failure
to learn from the analyses undergirding the different gender
claims, and thus to a failure to build on the doctrinal
implications of these claims. The intense, suffering-victimsubject focus of the subgroups (women-only versus sexualorientation/sodomy law-focused groups) limits the parameters
of the groups interested in more gender-relational advocacy.6
And the advocates are stymied by the tendency of the U.N.
structures to assume a gender specificity/singularity even if the
advocates have tried to explain differently.7 In a recent
interpretive statement, the Committee that monitors the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) has broken this binary by explicitly
integrating the SOGI rubric. This statement by CEDAW is the
subject of my analysis of U.N. structures below in Part V and
may be the exception that (so far) proves the rule of the binary
divisions within gender.
As this Essay proceeds, fair warning: the acronyms will

6. See, e.g., Statement of African Social Justice Activists on the Threats of
the British Government to “Cut Aid” to African Countries, WOMEN‘S GLOBAL
NETWORK FOR REPROD. RTS., http://www.wgnrr.org/news/statement-africansocial-justice-activists-threats-british-government-%E2%80%9Ccutaid%E2%80%9D-african-countri (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). The statement
invites a comparison and ranking when it notes ―a context of general human
rights violations, where women are almost as vulnerable as LGBTI people.‖
See id. (emphasis added). For an exploration of the victim subject as a central
trop of women‘s human rights organizing, see Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of
Victimization
Rhetoric:
Resurrecting
the
“Native”
Subject
in
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1
(2002) (arguing that the international women‘s rights movement‘s focus on
violence against women (VAW) has helped reinforce women as the victim
subject).
7. See infra Part III for an elaboration on the U.N. structures. For a
more complete discussion of the problem of the exclusionary siloes of U.N.
work, see Alice Miller & Mindy J. Roseman, Normalizing Sex and its
Discontents: Establishing Sexual Rights in International Law, 34 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER iii (2011). See also Lisa Crooms, Indivisible Rights and
Intersectional Identities or, “What Do Women's Human Rights Have to Do
with the Race Convention?,‖ 40 HOW. L.J. 619 (1997).
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continue to proliferate—VAW (violence against women), GBV
(gender-based violence), SGBV (sexual and gender-based
violence), LGBT (lesbian, gay bisexual and transgender),
LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex), MSM
(men who have sex with men), SOGI (sexual orientation and
gender identity). Advocates and scholars both bemoan the
extent to which movements around gender and sexuality have
become more known by their acronyms than their politics and
principles: indeed one way to understand the conceptual
problem around the narrowing sectarianism of the movements
is to see the work done by the condensing power of the
acronyms. But that is another essay.8
II. Gender as Solomon‘s Baby
I begin the mapping of ―gender territorialization‖ with
evidence of the overt struggle between advocates. While
tensions over who owns gender have been rumored for some
time, an explicit disagreement over gender came to a head in
2008-2009 in a process organized around the development of a
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
report, Gender Guidance National AIDS Responses.9 UNDP is a
founding co-sponsor of UNAIDS (the joint structure in the U.N.
through which resources, policies, and priorities of the U.N.‘s
coordinated response to HIV/AIDS are developed and
managed).10 UNDP adds to HIV/AIDS responses beyond those
of the health sector: it addresses ―dimensions of HIV that relate
to development planning and mainstreaming; governance of

8. Such an essay would take on the specific occlusions of ideas
accomplished by these acronyms, and especially note those concepts and
persons that are formally flagged in the acronym but nonetheless get short
shrift in actual advocacy and policy, such as ―lesbian‖ and ―inter-sex,‖ as well
as transgender persons and issues.
9. 22nd Meeting of the UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board,
Chiang Mai, Thai., Apr. 23-25, 2008, Draft Gender Guidance for National
AIDS Responses, UNAIDS/PCB(22)/08.3/Rev.1 (Apr. 11, 2008) [hereinafter
Draft Gender Guidance for National AIDS Responses].
10. About
Us,
UNITED
NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME,
http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2011).
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HIV responses; and law, human rights, gender equality and
sexual diversity.‖11 UNDP was responsible for preparing the
guidance for UNAIDS, as the lead agency on gender among the
UNAIDS co-sponsors. The phrasing around ―gender equality
and sexual diversity‖ was a hard fought and precious aspect of
UNDP‘s rights orientation, and interestingly, included an
unusual moment of U.N. agency perspicacity: a consensus
within UNAIDS co-sponsors and secretariat that ―gender‖
could be used in its broader, more relational sense to address
issues arising among and for diverse women, men, and
transpersons. The guidance note was meant to help
governments, donors, the U.N. system, and civil society12
understand why gender—especially gender inequalities—
mattered to the spread of, and responses to, the epidemic.
Advocates from many different sectors who were
experienced in global AIDS advocacy participated in a process
of consultation in 2008 and 2009. Among other steps, a
formally-constituted NGO delegation to the UNAIDS Program
Coordinating Board (PCB) participated in considerations of
direction and scope of the draft guidance note. Advocates have
noted that the PCB is a rare site of solid civil society
participation in the often closed-door U.N. system—one of what
feels like a handful of open sites remaining, which also means
that NGO participants responded to the outcomes with a
feeling of high stakes.13 Representatives included women and
women‘s health‘ groups, networks of people living with HIV or
AIDS, sex worker groups, youth groups, gay identified and
MSM groups, and transgender groups.
I will let texts excerpted from two related documents speak
to the struggle for the territory of gender. The first excerpt is
from the Executive Summary from the Guidance Note as
issued by UNAIDS:
The guidance encourages countries to

11. Id.
12. The U.N. thinks in these categories of actors, and builds its processes
around state interests first, and other groups second.
13. Special thanks to a close colleague for this observation from ―within
the trenches.‖

9

846

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

understand how harmful gender norms and
gender inequality contribute to the spread of
HIV, and how HIV differentially affects women,
men, girls and boys. It also points to the specific
impact of gender norms on HIV amongst men
who have sex with men, which affect this
population directly as well as contributing to the
broader epidemic, because many men have sex
with both men and women.
....
In consultation processes during the
development and pre-testing of the guidance, one
of the issues discussed extensively was the
degree to which the guidance should include
attention to men who have sex with men and to
transgender populations, given the direct
relevance of gender norms and gender inequality
to these groups. Many respondents asked for a
full integration of these issues and populations,
important in and of themselves as well as
because many men have sex with both men and
women. . . . However, others expressed concern
that attention to men who have sex with men
detracts from the importance of focusing on
women and girls and their unequal relationships
with men and boys, and suggested that it would
be more appropriate to keep the guidance focused
on the needs of girls and women and to develop
separate guidance documents addressing sexual
minorities.14
The Guidance note then proceeds to focus primarily on
women and girls, but does make reference to the fact that their
risks for HIV exposure are related to the risks born by men,
including men who have sex with men, sex workers, and transpopulations.
The compromise‘s focus on women, with limited reference
14. Draft Gender Guidance for National AIDS Responses, supra note 9,
at 7, 10.
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to the epidemics‘ connections across populations of the
Guidance Note, was the product of intense and painful
divisions among NGO advocates behind the scenes,
disagreements in which advocates questioned each other‘s
trustworthiness and overall human rights interests, all based
on their prioritization of groups (women, MSM, etc.) rendered
vulnerable by gender. As evidence of the tenor of the internal
dissension over gender I turn to quotations from a report
(publicly circulating) of a 2010 ―healing meeting‖ which was
called by and meant to respond to the bad feelings generated in
the process of the NGO participation in the PCB delegation.
The report from the ―healing meeting‖ says:
[I]n light of the tensions over the meaning of
gender in discussions at the UNAIDS board
meeting. The purpose of this meeting was to find
common ground among activists in the pursuit of
policies and programs that support multiple
constituencies: all women and girls in their
diversities and experience, gay and other men
who have sex with men, transgender people,
people who use drugs, people living with HIV,
and sex workers.
....
. . . [They highlighted] the need to shy away
from divisive debates over the term ―gender‖ by
highlighting specific populations. . . . just as the
group agreed to specify women, gay men and
other MSM, transgender communities rather
than use the term ―gender,‖. . . .15
....
Funding and competition for funding were
15. Notably, in terms of content of policy approaches, ―[p]articipants
found areas of common ground around shared goals of: decriminalizing same
sex relationships, unintentional HIV transmission, drug use, and ensuring
access to comprehensive reproductive services that support a woman to make
decisions about what happens with her body.‖ NGO Delegation to the
UNAIDS PCB, PCB NGO Delegation‘s ―Common Ground‖ Meeting Report, 2
(Oct. 19-20, 2010), http://unaidspcbngo.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/CGreport_EN.pdf [hereinafter Common Ground Report].

11

848

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

discussed as underlying causes of tension for the
communities. . . . earmarked for discussion in
future work, as there was a feeling that this topic
was not given the time it needed. The discussion
focused not only on equal access to resources but
also on the use of those resources . . . .
Participants talked about the way donor
funding pits groups or communities against one
another. . . . They discussed money as part of the
power dynamic and its use to silence all
communities.16
The NGO ―healing meeting‖ report, while written in
sometimes opaque and NGO-speak generalities, suggests first
in its title, and then in its text, the depth of wounded alliances
among advocate associated with women or with MSM/gay or
transgender women. It closes with tense commitments about
the assignment of gender to various groups for the future. Part
of the compromise agreement is that the word ―gender‖ as a
modifier is to be avoided in favor of specification of
communities: MSM, gay-identified persons, (hetero)sexual
women, transpersons, and male, female or trans sex workers—
an ironic result for advocacy groups constituted to think about
a ―gender guidance.‖
The concern of advocates that to use gender is to divide the
―baby‖ is so palpable that, in a world of multiple epidemics
(concentrated among sex worker, MSM, or IDU populations or
generalized throughout the population), gender as a term has
become a barrier to attending to the inequalities and biases
connected to gender stereotypes that govern the path of the
epidemic. Moreover, it is understood that the path of money is
gendered: funding for studies, for services, for outreach and
education, and for advocacy follows specific priorities—
including those set by the UNAIDS gender guidance note.17
It is worth noting that while each ―gender camp‖ has
certain kinds of access to power, none of the competing gender
16. Id. at 1, 3-5.
17. This struggle over money spans both prevention and treatment to
use the two categories most commonly at play in funding debates.
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advocates (women living with HIV, trans-women in sex work,
married man having sex with men, etc.) actually controls the
state or donor responses to their requests. Looking intersectionally, each of the differently situated ―gender claimants‖
may have an aspect of privilege and an aspect of abjection: the
―innocent infected wife‖ stands both as a viable, sympathetic
public victim and as a person without full legal rights in many
societies; the man having sex with men is both a man possibly
facing risks of violence or blackmail and other forms of coercion
in his town for his same-sex behavior, and, as a matter of law,
maybe the head of his household and the holder of sexual
privileges over his wife.
As a matter of ―gender,‖ they are all affected by gender
inequities and a set of organizing principles privileging certain
forms of masculinity and femininity, but in the silo-ization of
money and policy priorities, they can either address ―women
and girls‖ or ―non-gender normative men‖ (code word: sexual
minority). The histories and institutions of the work on these
populations are different—all marginalized, but differently
marginalized, commanding different supporters, agencies and
rhetoric, and some (like lesbian identified women) simply
invisible.18
III. Gender Steps Out19 and into the U.N.
I turn next to different institutional and historical
rhetorics of gender: the practices initially locating—indeed
fixing—women and gender, and gender as women, as a
permanent, reified U.N. category, and then the splitting of the
category of gendered rights into the mutually exclusionary (in
some practices) claims of gendered (heterowomen) and gay
men/transpersons (SOGI claims). To do this I present a brief
and therefore partial institutional snapshot of the genealogy
18. Cynthia C. Rothschild, The L and the G Word, MUJERES ADELANTE,
Aug.
8,
2008,
available
at
http://www.aln.org.za/downloads/Mujeres%20Adelante_Friday.pdf.
19. This subheading invokes a chapter in a book by Jonathan Ned Katz,
periodizing when ―the heterosexual steps out.‖ See JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE
INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY 83 (1995).
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and architecture of ―gender as women‖ in the U.N., and then I
track the rise of a new gender constituency—the SOGI
constituency—and its surprisingly new integration into a
previously ―woman-as if only one kind of woman‖ (i.e.
heterosexual bio-women) specific treaty, CEDAW.20
CEDAW of course is only one of the many venues and
structures that the U.N. has carved out over time and served
up to the world as ―addressing women.‖21 These women-specific
structures include: U.N. Charter-created political bodies
(where governments speak in their national interest), such as
the Commission on the Status of Women/CSW); independent
expert treaty-based bodies, such as CEDAW (part of the U.N.‘s
human rights treaty body system); and U.N. agencies and
funds (programmatic arms of the U.N. system constituted as
arms of the U.N. bureaucracy, such as the old Division for the
Advancement of Women/DAW or UNIFEM, a sub-agency of
UNDP, and the United Nations International Research and
Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UNINSTRAW). There are also special advisers on women to the
Secretary General, Special Rapporteurs on women and various
women-identified issues in the Human Rights Council, and a
new Special Representative to the Secretary General on Sexual
Violence in Conflict that provides reports to the Security
Council.
Most recently, in 2010 the U.N. rolled all of its womenidentified agencies into a single agency, the U.N. Entity on
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (U.N.
Women). Pressure from advocates and states concerned that
women and the programs serving them were still massively
disenfranchised and disproportionately impoverished around
the world, despite a proliferation of (minor) agencies and
procedures dedicated to women, forced this consolidation and
elevation (at least formally) of institutional attention to
20. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, DIVISION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
21. For a critique of the very subject/object ―woman‖ of CEDAW, see
Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What's Wrong with Women's Rights,
20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98 (2011).
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women.22 The NGO campaign to support this new agency
marked itself as UNGEAR—U.N. Gender Equality
Architecture Reform, and included groups that work on diverse
sexualities and diversity among gender roles—but its product,
i.e. what the Member States of the U.N. agreed to, was a U.N.
agency on women.23
The many other branches of the U.N. that address human
rights, health, and development are of course formally ―gender
neutral.‖24 Historically, these branches, including the old U.N.
Centre for Human Rights (now Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights) and the U.N. Development
Program, ignored both gender analysis and women in many
contexts with a vengeance, at best including references to
―women and children.‖25
The ―gender fights‖ of 1995 at the U.N.‘s Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing simultaneously opened the
U.N. to free-wheeling debates over the scope of gender (are
there five genders? Is talking about gender really talking about
homosexuality? What are the different ways to differently
gender women? How are men and women gendered? ) and, in
practice, produced gender work in the U.N. system which solely
meant work on women. This reduction (talking about gender
equals talking about women) held for the next decade and is
just breaking now, with SOGI-based rights work.
Following the Beijing Platform for Action, which stressed
gender mainstreaming for the entire U.N. system, the nonwomen branches of the U.N. have been the targets of now
22. U.N. Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women,
G.A. Res. 64/289, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/289 (July 21, 2010), http://www.unngls.org/IMG/pdf_Report_July_2010_N0947917.pdf.
23. GENDER EQUALITY ARCHITECTURE REFORM (GEAR) CAMPAIGN,
http://www.gearcampaign.org/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
24. This means gender mainstreaming is directed to all the Chartercreated political bodies of the Security Council, General Assembly,
Commission, now Human Rights Council, and its special mechanisms
(independent experts), the many agencies and funds (WHO, UNICEF,
UNFPA, UNDP, UNESCO), the various ad hoc tribunals, and the ICC.
25. For an early review of the ―faint‖ impress of gender analysis in the
U.N. human rights bodies, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP,
TOKEN GESTURES: WOMEN‘S HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED NATION REPORTING
(1993).
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predictably regular gender mainstreaming resolutions, and
plans calling on them to ―ask the woman question‖ as an aspect
of their work. Gender mainstreaming in IHRL drives funding
for projects targeting and evaluations assessing women‘s rights
in the context of concerns for violence, health, and equality in
political life, housing, and education. Overall, with some
exceptions, remarkably little of the project of gender
mainstreaming has addressed background structural rules
organizing social relations between persons deemed male and
female (according to presumed male-female biological sex
differences), and very little in the U.N.—up until the UNAIDS
gender guidance note—has attempted to address men in their
relationships to each other, or women in their relationships to
each other as ―engendering,‖ or as a necessary component of
gender mainstreaming.
Thus, although the ―gender fights‖ of 1995 served to
propagandize around fears that ―gender‖ opened the door to
homosexuality and bi-sexuality (and bestiality and pedophilia,
in some delegation accounts), no one to my knowledge in the
U.N. has worried about gender mainstreaming requiring
attention to diversity of gender among men (i.e. men who have
sex with men or trans persons). Notably a few opponents of
gender mainstreaming in Europe have sought to call attention
to the potential of gender mainstreaming work to challenge the
status of hetero-normative men, and the notion of their fixed
identities and behaviors.26 A few self-avowed Christian-values
groups have claimed a link between gender mainstreaming and
the homosexual agenda in the Caribbean, but notably, the
groups working on decriminalizing so-called sodomy laws do
not use the term gender mainstreaming to capture their work.27
26. It is notable that gender mainstreaming has targeted changing men
(education, policies engaging with their sense of their roles) in only a few
settings, and European examples of gender mainstreaming actually taking on
education and roles of boys and men has been attacked for this by Vatican
inspired critics. See, e.g., Gabriele Kuby, Gender Mainstreaming—The Secret
Revolution,
VATICAN
MAG.
(2008),
available
at
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2008_docs/GenderMainstreaming.pdf.
Thanks to Mary Anne Case for calling this work to my attention.
27. See, e.g., E-mail from The Beliz Action Team to Colin Robinson (Oct.
30, 2011, 21:28 PDT) (on file with author) (―The end goal is SAME SEX
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A few scholars have begun to point out that some new gender
norms are finding their way into global programming outside
the U.N. through gender mainstreaming, such as in lending
programs of the World Bank, and its new vision of
companionate marriage.28 But overall, I would argue that
gender sectarianism put blinders on both advocacy and
programmatic work in the U.N., limiting gender functionally in
U.N. programming to ―asking about women.‖ And in the eyes of
many rights advocates, not doing that very well.
Generally speaking, no one, including traditional women‘s
rights advocates, is happy with the current status of gender
mainstreaming work, or with the status of the term ―gender.‖ It
turns out that the focus on women as sole owners of gender has
not led to speedy global change, including reduction of ―GBV.‖
Recent scholarship from feminists concerned about the lack of
progress on women‘s equality has begun examining the use of
gender at the U.N. One piece in the stream of gender-asfeminism, by Valerie Oosterveld, is a magisterial piece
canvassing all the uses of gender in the U.N. gender
mainstreaming system. She describes the definitions of gender
as either thick (full of elaborations on the meaning and
relationships of gender and sex) or thin (undefined). She points
out that U.N. agencies use thick ascriptions of gender, while
thin is the mode of multilateral negotiations, in part because
states cannot agree on what they mean by gender.29 Yet the
thick elaborations still produce relatively impoverished projects
or at least in human rights, projects that merely add and stir

MARRIAGE in Belize and a broad HOMOSEXUAL AGENDA of what’s called
“GENDER MAINSTREAMING,” making the gay & lesbian lifestyle accepted
in our society & culture.‖).
28. See Kate Bedford, Loving to Straighten out Development: Sexuality
and Ethno-development in the World Bank’s Ecuadorian Lending, 13
FEMINIST
LEGAL
STUD.
295
(2005),
available
at
http://kar.kent.ac.uk/1693/1/Straighten_Out_30OCT07DP.pdf,
for
an
innovative example of this kind of study; in this case, the Bank is reaching
both men and women in order to re-configure heterosexual marriage around
the world into a modern, companionate mode.
29. See Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for
International Criminal Justice, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 55, 66-70 (2005).
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attention to women in service of gender equality.30
However, my brief foray into tensions within gender
advocacy circles suggests that fears over losing prioritization of
funding for work on women, as well as some lingering tensions
over how to trust attention to men (crudely put, does studying
men and masculinity diverting attention from the abuse of
women as well as re-center men as the hegemonic subject?)
continue to operate. Ironically, this anxiety among advocates
who are interested in changing gender roles, but are divided on
whose gender to attend to, operates alongside and
synergistically with another, distinctly conservative anxiety.
This conservative anxiety arises within some governments and
many religious structures that fear that gender analysis will
ultimately succeed in changing the status quo on masculinity
and femininity. Working paradoxically together, the divisions
within progressive advocates coupled with the resistance
among status quo conservatives operate to keep gender
analysis and work constrained.31
Notably, Oosterveld canvassed the negotiated texts from
U.N. member states in part to better interpret the scope of
―gender-based persecution‖ in the crimes against humanity
section of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. This use of gender is the first codification of the term
―gender‖ in international law making, here in a multilateral
treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.).
The word‘s inclusion in the Rome Statute was hard fought and
generated an annotation which reads: ―For the purposes of this
Statute, it is understood that the term ‗gender‘ refers to the two
sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term
‗gender‘ does not indicate any meaning different from the
above.‖32 After the intensity of the fight over the inclusion of
30. See Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender
Mainstreaming and Human Rights at the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 1 (2005).
31. A new UNDP publication on this again proves the rule. See Myra
Betron, Gary Barker, Juan Manuel Contreras & Dean Peacock, Men,
Masculinities and HIV/AIDS: Strategies for Action, SONKE GENDER JUST.
NETWORK (forthcoming 2011/2012) (on file with author).
32. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(3), July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, 1004-09.
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the word gender as a mode of persecution (intense, because
everyone understood they were fighting over the possibilities
that gender could be unmoored from women as female, even as
they radically disagreed on the usefulness and the scope of the
un-mooring) the banality of the definition signals a lowest
common denominator resolution, as one of my colleagues
characterized it.33 Moreover, it is an empty tautology.
Now that the dust has settled from the Rome Statute fight,
I think the tautology would arguably allow an expansive
reading of ―gender-based persecution‖ as a crime against
humanity, including attacks on persons because they failed to
follow the rules defining what sexed (male- and femaleidentified) bodies are supposed to do, all other elements of the
definition of the crime being met. Can we argue that the antigender-equality advocates‘ attempt to close down gender in the
Rome Statute produced a text that in fact leaves space for
opening gender up to a more capacious reach of persons and
bodies? As yet, we have not seen an operationalization of this
capaciousness in the work of the court, however.
IV. Deafening (Gendered) Silence between ―Women‖ and
―SOGI‖
Which brings this Essay back to the importance of who and
what fills in the construct of gender. Whose life motivates
gender advocacy? This query leads to a deeper engagement
with my second indicator of gender territorialization: silence
between gender claims and projects. As the proceeding sections
suggest, contemporary advocacy claims are channeled into one
of two gender streams in international human rights law work:
either directed at women and often concerning violence and
some aspect of sexual and reproductive health (including
abortion, SGBV, and sexual exploitation) or now, under the
new SOGI vehicle, directed at gay men or trans persons (often
MTF) and embracing freedom from violence, and police or other

33. Compare Oosterveld, supra note 29, with Janet Halley, Rape At
Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence
in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2008).
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criminal justice interference with rights of privacy or
expression.34 The stream of work under which MSM, gayidentified global work has begun to proceed since around 2006
is SOGI, a formulation initially proposed as a way to move
beyond Western-identified constructs of ―gay‖ and the LGBT
identity. SOGI has now been reified in global advocacy by a
host of NGO texts, campaigns, and publications, including the
Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of Human Rights
Law to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (YyP),35 a new
case book on comparative legal decisions on SOGI at the
national level by the International Commission of Jurists, and
many other publications, including a new UN report by the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.36
The terms of SOGI‘s application deserve much closer
examination. The acronym stands in for, and obscures, a much
more complex reality of diverse sexual and gender practices.
For example, same-sex sexual practices under SOGI are
understood to be evidence of a (homo)sexual orientation (SO),
which is in turn unjustly targeted by the criminal law.

34. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, SEXUALITY
HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Girard, supra note 5; Alice M. Miller, Sexual but
Not Reproductive: Exploring the Junction and Disjunction of Sexual and
Reproductive Rights, 4 HEALTH HUM. RTS. 68 (2000), available at
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/47/137_web.pdf; Ignacio Saiz, Bracketing
Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation-A Decade of Development
and Denial at the U.N. (Sexuality Policy Watch, Working Paper No. 2, 2005).
There is a compelling argument that sexual violence is now such a strong
focus in rights advocacy that it deserves to be called its own ―gender stream.‖
This point was flagged by one of my reviewers.
35. See THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
GENDER
IDENTITY
6-7
(Mar.
2007),
available
at
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf
[hereinafter
THE
YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES].
36. INT‘L COMM‘N OF JURISTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY AND
JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE LAW CASEBOOK (2011), available at
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=349&sessID=&langage=1&myPage=L
egal_Documentation&id=23865. For the just released UN report, see UN
Human Rights Council, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON DISCRIMINATORY LAWS AND PRACTICES AND ACTS OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS BASED ON THEIR SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
GENDER
IDENTITY
(2011),
available
at
www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/hrcouncil/19session/reports.htm.
AND
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However, in reality, many of the laws criminalizing same-sex
sexual conduct, or non-reproductive sexual conduct more
generally, do not require any manifestation of a stable
―orientation,‖ merely same-sex or non-reproductive sexual
practice. However, we are now at an historical moment where
advocates can reasonably claim that the effect of penalizing a
conduct is also to penalize an orientation or an identity (a
SOGI violation). This claim—that an emerging homosexual
identity is being proscribed—is under-inclusive: some of those
who are harassed or arrested under the criminalization laws
may identify with a homosexual orientation, but many other
may not. On the most basic level, the motivation of the
criminalization ought not to matter, as consensual same sex
sexual conduct ought to be free of criminal regulation
regardless of its relationship to an expression of an identity.
But it is not quite right to organize all opposition to these laws
as if they only affect homosexual orientation.
Moreover, it is not always clear what the link to gender is
(or is intended to be) vis-à-vis sexual orientation. Persons of
non-traditional gender deportment and those who wish to have
a distinct or new gendered identity may or may not also be
oriented ―homosexual.‖ In practice, however, they may be
punished under laws and systems that act as if a bio-males‘
donning of a skirt is evidence of homosexual behavior even if no
actual evidence of same sex, sexual activity has been produced.
However, today gender identity (GI) is sutured to sexual
orientation in this SOGI phrase in ways that have so far also
been non-productive for a cross-gender (i.e., across trans and
bio-women) analyses and coalitions. For example, in the 2007
Yogyakarta Principles,37 gender is included as ―gender identity‖
and has the odd effect of being less immediately friendly to use
by feminist (i.e. women) gender advocates. Perhaps some of
37. The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International
Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,
THE
YOGYAKARTA
PRINCIPLES
(Mar.
2007),
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf. I am a signatory of
the Principles, participated in various steps of their drafting and work for
their greater acceptance. I am also very aware of their flaws, which I have
spoken to in various settings. See, e.g., THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, YOGYAKARTA
PRINCIPLES WORKING GROUP MEETING SUMMARY 4-6 (Mar. 11-12, 2009).
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this chill is due to the YyP‘s form: the YyP‘s betray a preference
for classic civil and political rights, a focus on public life. I
would argue that the Principles‘ failure to address gendered
repressions within families, which affect so many bio-girls and
women, among other aspects, produce a model of gender
identity that is static. The YyP, despite their revolutionary and
important character also produce a rather univocal stance on
gender expression, as if built only in regard to a certain version
of transgender.38
Overall, within the Human Rights Council and the other
venues (government ministries, UNHCR, etc.) that have taken
up the SOGI approach, the direction of the work suggests that
SOGI is understood to benefit MSM, gay identified men, and
MTF trans persons. There is much less effort to link work on
SOGI to work on women‘s rights and to gender mainstreaming.
To counter this concern, some sexual rights/queer feminists in
human rights advocacy have been dedicated supporters of the
diffusion of the YyP in particular, and SOGI rights claims,
more generally around the globe, and work against the tide to
open up SOGI‘s lock on gender to merge it with a diversity of
women‘s claims around gender expression and diversity, and to
unpack ―women‖ as a diverse category.
V. Whose Gender is Expressed through Gender Identity in a
Woman‘s Convention?
This rare use of SOGI as a claim within women‘s human
rights makes SOGI‘s sudden appearance in two new general
recommendations adopted by CEDAW in late 2010 all the more
startling, and worthy of interrogation: how did it get there, and
does it mean something interesting for gender/sex in CEDAW
that it did? Does it remedy the silence and bifurcation between
gender-as-women and gender as gay-ish man?
CEDAW has been among the most resistant sites in the

38. Many of these flaws are being addressed by advocates, e.g., a recent
Guide to Activists seeks to present ways to work through these problems. An
Activist’s
Guide
to
the
Yogyakarta
Principles,
http://www.ypinaction.org/content/activists_guide (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
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human rights treaty system for work on diverse sexualities or
diversity of gender expression among women. This resistance, I
have argued elsewhere, stems in part from the Committee‘s
paralysis by its status as a symbol, even prize, of political
struggles over gender equality.39 It is hyper-scrutinized by
conservative advocates who are often both anti-gender equality
and anti-sexual rights: the Catholic and Family Human Rights
Institute (C-Fam) and the Heritage Foundation have both
made CEDAW a special target of attacks.40
CEDAW‘s non-discrimination imperative (ensuring the
ability of women to enjoy their rights on an equal basis with
men) in Article 1 directs governments in Article 5 to eliminate
―prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.‖41
CEDAW‘s work follows the male-female binary as set up by its
mandate: its work has been predictable, which is not to say
unimportant—the practices of gender control of women are real
and serious, and often deadly. In service to this concern,
however, CEDAW focuses predominately on women‘s
vulnerability to abuse at the hands of men, and to girls and
women‘s exclusion from equality with men in spheres of public
and private life, only some times touching on the
39. See Alice M. Miller & Mindy J. Roseman, Sexual and Reproductive
Rights at the United Nations: Frustration or Fulfillment, 19 REPROD. HEALTH
MATTERS 102 (2011).
40. For a discussion of how the U.N., and CEDAW in general, fear direct
protection of women‘s sexuality, see GRACE SMITH MELTON, THE HERITAGE
FOUND., CEDAW: HOW U.N. INTERFERENCE THREATENS THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICAN
WOMEN
(2009),
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/01/CEDAW-How-UNInterference-Threatens-the-Rights-of-American-Women; Susan Yoshihara,
CEDAW Reality Check (Catholic Family & Human Rights Inst., Briefing
Paper
No.
3,
2007),
available
at
http://www.cfam.org/docLib/20080626_CEDAW_Reality_Check.pdf. See also CYNTHIA
ROTHSCHILD, INT‘L GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM‘N & THE CTR. FOR
WOMEN‘S LEADERSHIP, WRITTEN OUT: HOW SEXUALITY IS USED TO ATTACK
WOMEN‘S ORGANIZING (2005), available at http://www.iglhrc.org/cgibin/iowa/article/publications/reportsandpublications/8.html.
41. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW].
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discriminatory impacts of intra-gender regulation of women,
for example at the hands of mothers-in law in some contexts.
CEDAW has strongly criticized exclusions and
disadvantages to women which are produced by the constraints
of social, family, and legal pressure to conform (e.g., in the
manifestation of too few women in non-traditional women‘s
work); and has deemed violence an aspect of enforcing
conformity to be ―good, traditional‖ women. However, it has
been relatively chary in work on how gender-analysis works to
protect the rights of ―bad women‖ (i.e., women who transgress
multiple gender roles or violate other social rules), such as
women under prosecution for crime (including war crimes),
women who sell sex,42 and for women who are too different
(sexually or in gender performance) from other women. In
regard to trans-women and lesbians, the Committee has on
occasion praised state recognition of gender-diversity-within
women as a group. For example, CEDAW has used its
―concluding comments‖ (the public statements made by the
treaty body as part of the evaluation of the country reports
made by States party to the treaty to this effect43 when rights
42. For an early concern about ―bad women,‖ see Radhika
Coomaraswamy, To Bellow like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse
of Rights, in WOMEN‘S RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
1994).
43. A very recent set of comments to South Africa is particularly rich on
sexual orientation:
39.
The Committee notes that the State party has in its
Constitution the prohibition of discrimination based on the
sexual orientation of individuals. However, the Committee
expresses grave concern about reported sexual offences and
murder committed against women on account of their
sexual orientation. The Committee further expresses its
serious concern about the practice of so called ―corrective
rape‖ of lesbians.
40.
The Committee calls on the State party to abide by
its Constitutional provisions and to provide effective
protection from violence and discrimination against women
based on their sexual orientation, in particular through the
enactment of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation
that would include the prohibition of multiple forms of
discrimination against women on all grounds, including on
the grounds of sexual orientation. The Committee further
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issues on lesbians or trans women were raised by NGO
submissions or state reports. Overall, however, the
Committee‘s interpretive work has been very narrow vis-à-vis
women and gender. One way to think of this narrowness is that
CEDAW has accepted a gender-limited understanding of its
role in protecting women‘s equality rights: that women should
be able to pursue equality with men in the economic sphere,
regardless of gender stereotype, but not that women or men
should radically remake the rules of inequitable or repressed
respectable society. I think it is fair to say that the Committee‘s
vista of protection of women‘s rights under CEDAW has been
limited by its own sexual and gender normativity, and it has
measured women‘s equality with men in a limited register.
Advocates have been dancing gingerly around getting
CEDAW to formally address non-hetero-normativity, especially
sexual diversity, as a prohibited basis for discrimination
against women for over fifteen years, (i.e., through a gender
recommendation or interpretive statement).44 Insider reports
have made it clear that in the past some members of the
Committee were ready to quit before allowing diversity of
sexual orientation to be addressed as a matter of human rights
laws‘ protections. Thus, while the concepts linked to gender
identity or expression could be useful for a range of women,
and therefore be key aspects of women‘s human rights analysis
generally, they have not been used; moreover, trans women as
rights holders under CEDAW did not garner attention as
specific issues in the Committee‘s jurisprudence until recently,
recommends the State party to continue its sensitization
campaign aimed at the general public, as well as providing
appropriate training to law enforcement officials and other
relevant actors.
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 48th Sess., Jan. 17-Feb. 4, 2011, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/ZAF/CO/4 (Apr. 5, 2011).
44. For a discussion of CEDAW‘s silence on lesbianism, see generally
INT‘L GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM‘N, UNSPOKEN RULES: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND WOMEN‘S HUMAN RIGHTS (Rachel Rosenbloom ed., 1995);
Julie Mertus, The Rejection of Human Rights Framings: The Case of LGBT
Advocacy in the U.S., 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 1036 (2007).
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despite the efforts of advocates since the early 1990s.
Yet, in two general recommendations adopted by the
Committee in December 2010, one on older women and one on
state obligation under article 2 the Convention, the CEDAW
Committee has now inserted ―sexual orientation and gender
identity‖ as part of their list of prohibited grounds of
discrimination.45 The two General Recommendations are a
fascinating pastiche of terminologies: I think the use of the
terms ―sexual orientation and gender identity‖ in these 2010
statements reflects the march of the SOGI advocacy—this
phrase appears in both recommendations, even as drafters
initially reached for words like ―sexuality different lifestyles‖
and ―lesbian women‖ in their first debates over the terminology
in the texts.46 General Recommendation 28 (GR 28) elaborates
the core commitments that states undertake in ratifying the
treaty and is therefore a central doctrinal text, so I will focus
on its terms. In GR 28, SOGI appears in the section addressing
intersectional discrimination. The recommendation places
SOGI in the midst of a list of characteristics of women, as in its
list of other discriminatory grounds, i.e. ―race, ethnicity,
religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, and sexual
45. This section draws from a recently published article. See Mindy Jane
Roseman & Alice M. Miller, Normalizing Sex and Its Discontents:
Establishing Sexual Rights in International Law, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
313 (2011). See also U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, General Recommendation No. 27 on Older Women and
Protection of Their Human Rights, 47th Sess., Oct. 4-22, 2010, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.1
(Oct.
19,
2010),
available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-2010-47GC1.pdf; U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties
Under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 47th Sess., Oct. 4-22, 2010, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2
(Oct.
19,
2010),
available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-2010-47GC2.pdf.
46. For example, three of the twenty-three experts voted in favor of the
term ―sexuality or different lifestyles‖ in their discussion of terminology for
the general recommendations. At other points during their debates, a
majority initially chose the terms ―lesbian women‖ and ―women with different
lifestyles.‖ See Rep. of the CEDAW, 46th-48th Sess., July 12-30, 2010, Oct. 422, 2010, Jan. 17-Feb. 4, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/66/38; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp.
No. 38 (2011), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/38.
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orientation and gender identity.‖47 The rote inclusion has the
strange effect of treating sexual orientation and gender identity
differences as connected no more or less to sex as disability,
ethnicity, or refugee status are connected. And it has the effect
of assuming a permanent connection between (homo)sexual
orientation and (non-conforming) gender identity for women, a
connection between gayness and trans–ness which has already
been naturalized for men.
It is entirely unclear to me what this inclusion of SOGI
means to the Committee. For example what does it connote
about the protections of CEDAW vis-à-vis the gender
expression of fem lesbians (women who dress and comport
themselves as socially stereotypical feminine women and are in
lesbian relationships or claim a lesbian identity) or butch
straight women (women who dress and comport themselves in
ways society deems masculine, and are in heterosexual
relationships or identify as heterosexual)? Will the Committee
require full genital and breast creation surgery for transwomen
to count as women under the Convention? We do not have
enough information from its limited past work on gender
diversity within women to know.
Each of the enumerated prohibited grounds for
discrimination in CEDAW‘s list of terms has a unique and
specific interaction with the treaty‘s focal ground of
discrimination on the basis of sex. Inter-sectional analysis
should require us to think through the mechanisms and the
effects of each of these interactions, such as: age and sex; sex
and race; or sex and refugee status, etc. The interactions can be
cumulative: sex and sexual orientation and refugee status and
national origin, for example. In working through the
interactions of these axes of discrimination and the inclusion of
SOGI, part of me applauds the Committee‘s inclusion of SOGI
as just two sets of characteristics among many, thereby
escaping the (false) imprisonment of all understanding of
sexuality under the sex/gender matrix.
47. See General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of
States Parties Under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 45, at 5 (emphasis
added).
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However, given the questions and lack of an institutional
history in engaging with diverse sexualities and gender in
CEDAW‘s history, the more likely explanation for the rather
wooden inclusion is a lack of in-depth discussion within the
Committee on the nuances of the terms ―sexual orientation‖ or
―gender identity.‖ I would posit that the political engine that
was sufficient to overcome the log jam of CEDAW‘s selfprotective fear of naming sexual diversity was also an engine
that did not have the analytic tools to explain the connections,
in part because the bifurcated gender advocacy practice I am
describing in this Essay.
SOGI has proved itself to be a powerful neologism; it calls
forth new advocacy but may also obscure past work on
diversity of gender roles, expressions and conducts, as well as
diversity of sexuality. Readers of earlier drafts of this Essay
asked, what has happened to scholarly attention to the
advocacy work to protect women who want to live without
marrying men regardless of the direction of their erotic desire,
or of persons who seek to have sex without erotic motivation,
but for well-considered strategic and material advantage? My
concern is that SOGI, and the attention to very particular
persons that are now constructed as its objects, freezes gender
into a singular identity, and may fail to protect a diversity of
practices for persons across male, female spectra. Both
advocacy and scholarship are constrained. I am hopeful but not
confident that CEDAW‘s recent incorporation of SOGI, however
wooden, may help unfreeze the rigidity of SOGI‘s attachment to
bio-male bodies; for it to do so, however, requires supporting
analysis of greater complexity than many advocates are
currently deploying in their blinkered streams.
VI. Gender as if Sexuality48
CEDAW‘s initial silence on gender diversity, and now its
explosive shout out to gender and sexual diversity, calls our
attention back to the constantly invoked, but today the far too
48. For an excellent introduction to sexual rights advocacy at the UN
and its spillover effects on gender, see Girard, supra note 5.
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rarely examined, link between gender diversity and sexual
diversity. Here propagandists for the Vatican have named the
beast best: Gabriele Kuby, a German advocate for the Vatican,
flagged earlier for her unusual attention to gender
mainstreaming as harming men, writes:
A specter is haunting the world, the specter
of―gender! Hardly anyone knows this concept,
although it is extremely powerful and has
extended its influence over international and
national institutions. The gender ideology is in
the process of creating a new man, whose
freedom should include the choice of his sex and
sexual orientation. This means to arbitrarily
decide whether he or she wants to be man or
woman, heterosexual, gay, lesbian, bisexual, or
transsexual (GLBT).49
Kuby articulates a pan-gender-sexuality link, i.e. the way
in which women and men, heterosexuality, and homosexuality
are somehow uniquely and tightly linked as a set of practices
and ideas: vary gender and you must create (perverse)
variation in sexual orientation and sexual conduct. Yet the very
advocates against whom she mobilizes Christian values are
themselves not currently linking their work on gender across
their silos of work on heterosexuality and homosexuality, or
across regulation of women and regulation of men or regulation
of trans persons. In calling for advocates to attend to the way
their work on gender has implications across a great diversity
of gender and sexuality I am not calling for a reversion to the
simplistic MacKinnonite (or Kuby) framework that claims that
all of gender can be explained simply by sexuality.
For advocates seeking freedoms around gender, sexuality
is currently the prime site for attaching rights protections for
many aspects of nonconformity. This is true for gender-nonconforming men, as if sexual conduct were the only aspect of
their diversity worth rights protection. It is also true when
sexuality is emphasized as the site of harm for women, as if
49. Kuby, supra note 26.
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abusive sexual activity was the only acts through which women
experience gendered harm. I am a sexual rights advocate, so I
am not saying sex is not important, but we must re-incorporate
other planes of injustice (material/market and cultural/political
and racial/ethnic) to ensure that we have given up the territory
of non-sexual struggles as places where we fight for equality
and diversity.50
I think advocates and scholars need to confront the ways
that the deafening silences between gender advocates and
advocates‘ fights over the Solomon‘s baby of gender are
evidence of incomplete gender analysis and truncated political
alliance building. Advocates in human rights can profitably
research, document, and publicize the many kinds of links—
and discontinuities— within gender, and between gender and
sexuality in radically different contexts around the globe.
Working from the understanding that gender and sexuality are
linked but not congruent systems, such that gender contributes
to but cannot alone account for sexual variation, and that
paying attention to how gender and sexuality are linked not
only to each other but also are implicated in other structures of
power, could then return to gender analyses early potential as
a tool for global justice for all persons. 51
In this Essay I have sought to call attention to the way
that gender non-conformity conduct challenges hetero-

50. See Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence against Women, and Human
Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies Get Protection, 7 HEALTH & HUM.
RTS. 16 (2004) (exploring the hyper-visibility of sexual violence against
women in the women‘s rights movements).
51. My position relies on the insight Gayle Rubin initially laid out in her
early and still powerful essay of 1986. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a
Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER:
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1987). For her later
comments on gender as an analytic tool, see Judith Butler, Against Proper
Objects, in FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY 1 (Naomi Schor & Elizabeth
Weed eds., 1997). I am grateful to many conversations over the last decade
with Carole S. Vance for deepening my understanding of these complexities.
Thus, in my scheme, trans-genderism is just that—transiting across gender
(between or choosing masculine identities from feminine birth assignment or
vice versa). It does not signal ―gay‖ unless more factors of sexuality are
added; however, in the U.N.‘s institutionalization of gender, transgender is a
―sexual minority.‖
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normative sexuality, but also note that we must distinguish
when gender is doing work/being used to do work outside, or at
least alongside, of the sexual in the sense of sexual conduct.
The gender sectarianism of today‘s advocates makes these
distinctions very hard to discern—the fissures obscure the
many ways that gender is not all about/only about sex and vice
versa.
VII. Gender as a Grant, an Agenda Item or as a Way Forward?
As Gita Sen has described, part of the current problem can
be traced to the assimilation of gender to shorthand struggles
within identity politics, rather than a use of gender analysis to
focus on relational power constructs working through meaning
ascribed on the basis of bio-sex differences.52 She highlights the
way that in identity-based advocacy, gender appears in some
contexts as the term substituting for the word ―women,‖ or in
other contexts gender flags gay men or transpersons but ceases
to capture the systems of gender that operate at all levels to
create vulnerabilities and privileges across these various
categories.
I argue that CEDAW included SOGI not as part of a deep
analysis of the structures of gender and the related systems of
sexuality that but as a result of a mix of limited understanding
and the pressure of internal and external politics. This process
of uneven but potentially powerful or reductive inclusion of
new ideas in the development of rights jurisprudence is of
course not unique to CEDAW. In my experience accidental,
inadvertent progress and some deliberate advance marks all of
law making in which social movements, experts, and States
interact at the U.N. The Committee was no doubt was trying to
catch up with contemporary gender/sex concerns, but in its
laboring over the politics of diversity it was led to use SOGI
because this neologism now constitutes the set of terms that
52. Interview by Mindy Jane Roseman with Gita Sen, Public Policy
Professor, Ctr. for Pub. Policy, Sir Ratan Tata Chair Professor, Indian Inst. of
Mgmt., at Harvard Law School (Dec. 15 2009). For a short history of the
―apolitical‖ use of the word ―gender,‖ see Joanna Regulska & Mindy
Roseman, What is Gender, 5 TRANSITIONS 24, 24-29 (1998).
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have become the most available words in the lexicon of rights,
gender and sexuality. They are part of an important,
influential, and funded campaign for rights associated with
SOGI.
In the world of advocacy today, as foretold in a cautionary
tale by Ann Snitow in 1999, ―gender is a grant.‖53 Neither I nor
Snitow mean attention to funding to be simplistically damning:
it is rather a recognition of the multiple material realities that
shape advocacy practice as a modern form, especially as it
moves from volunteer elites to paid, more diverse albeit
predominately but not exclusively middle class players. And
such attention flags the costs of playing in the international
spheres.54
What I do intend to connote by ―gender as a grant,‖
however, is that one of the effects of grant-making on the NGO
practice of working with gender is a move toward activities
that have continuity over grant periods, and strategies that
produce measurable, goals. In reports to funders, NGOs must
demonstrate that targets and goals can be met.55 This push
toward realizable strategies by itself is not a problem. (Nor is
the main problem the grim new work of living from funder‘s
deadline to funder‘s deadline, as described by one of Snitow‘s

53. Ann Snitow, Cautionary Tales, 93 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 35, 40
(1999).
54. To speak of funding and grants in this way is emphatically not to be
sucked into the over-heated notion that well-funded international and
national NGOs are running the world, a la the critiques of Joseph Massad et
al., calling out the ―Gay International.‖ One can be concerned with the
disproportionately Northern interventions and inaccurate renderings of
complex gender/sex politics without granting them sole power in running the
world, including by ―disappearing‖ the actual and increasingly strong voices
from the global South in these discussions, and without sliding into alliances
with repressive regimes in the West and the East as they deploy claims of
cultural purity and ―Western Export‖ politics to silence dissidents.
55. The hugely ethically important question of ―accountable to whom‖ is
suggested but not addressed in this discussion. For an exploration of the
reification of ―accountability to beneficiaries‖ in the humanitarian world, see
Meg Satterthwaite, Indicators in Crisis: Rights Based Humanitarian
Indicators in Post Earthquake Haiti, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 865 (2011).
For a trenchant, if self-referential discussion of human rights ―doing wrong,‖
see DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM (2005).
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colleagues in the Network of East-West Women.) However, I
think part of the real problem is that ―gender as a grant‖
requires an easily describable, mono-vocal past and a
predictable, or at least, bench-markable, future. A problem in
―gender as a grant‖ is that the process of working in this way,
in defining benchmarks and elaborating where one‘s ―valueadded‖ lies, exacerbates working with ―gender as a territory.‖56
―Gender as a grant‖ requires asserting that your issue will be
raised in a notable, stand-alone way, and it is further reified by
the practice of advocating for specific agenda items in U.N. fora
as evidence of the legitimacy of your issue.
In this institutionalization of identifiable success stories in
gender, gender claims are rewarded when tagged to gender-aswomen, in one part of the agenda (e.g., in the Human Rights
Council), and rewarded again when gender is tagged to as
gender identity and sexual orientation, linked to a different
agenda item in that same Session.
As advocates, we fight to advance what we believe to be
important, and our failures, and even more terrifyingly our
successes, can be institutionalized and take on shapes and
practices we did not intend. In short, we screw up. In the
relative success of putting gender into institutional terms, we
have created gender territories to be defended, and gendered
issues as border territory to be overtaken through struggles
among human rights advocates.
As scholars our critiques are useful to alert advocates to
the collateral damage of successes, of ―strategic essentialisms‖
about women, gender, transgendered persons, gay-ness, and to
take measure of the moves under foot. But the usefulness of
scholars has also been lessened by our tendency to critique
from behind the walls of the academy, as well as by a tendency
to discover a topic, elaborate, publish, and move on before
hearing back from engaged advocates—in regard to their
efforts to incorporate critiques. Perhaps some of this impetus
56. As Snitow also said over a decade ago: ―‗Gender‘ is not a nation to
which anyone is required to migrate. It is, rather, a variable, a central one in
the future ways in which labor, government power and economic activity are
all going to be structured, not to mention daily psychic life.‖ Snitow, supra
note 53, at 42.
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also is driven by trends in funding in the academy—our own,
―gender as a grant‖ problem.
As I asserted at the beginning, gender as an analytic tool
can still perform important justice work, although not always
by itself, but intertwined with attention to analytics of race,
citizenship, age, sexuality, and other axes of power and
difference. Some U.N. players seek to freeze gender as a binary
of man/woman in service of their own politico-religious
imperatives, such as the Holy See or the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC), and the George Bush administration
(a position not yet fully corrected under President Obama).
But my analysis suggests that the Holy See‘s position is a
paradox: its advocacy leadership has figured out how to
operationalize a duality: they preach about the rules of gender
as if they were separate universes of law (the law of women,
the law of men).57 At the same time, resistant even to the use of
the word ―gender,‖ the Holy See‘s advocates make a point of
publicizing the structural and material links between gender
diversities and sexual diversities, claiming vast conspiracies of
gender advocates, in order to shut down diversity. Ironically
the groups seeking to open up that diversity, by virtue of
myopic sectarianism, have reduced their ability to unify across
genders and sexualities, leaving (hetero)women squaring off as
if against gay men.
I would argue that persisting in turf wars or disregarding
the gender advocacy of others is to further the destruction of
the very coalitions and political synergies that gender as an
analytic tool initially made possible, and which could re-emerge
as a productive lens with which to engage with human rights.
That is to say, gender territorialization threatens to strike a
mortal blow to gender as a politically useful rubric for
expansive and generous social justice work in global human
rights. This serious blow follows on and is exacerbated by
another fault line within gender and rights, arising when
57. Pope Benedict XVI, Message of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI for
the Celebration of the World Day of Peace: The Human Person, the Heart of
Peace,
VATICAN:
THE
HOLY
SEE
(Jan.
1,
2007),
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/documents/hf
_ben-xvi_mes_20061208_xl-world-day-peace_en.html.
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gender frames fail to attend to the ways in which other systems
of power organized around race, nationality, age, (dis)ability,
language, or ethnicity themselves construct and are altered in
turn by, gender, and at times by sexuality and thence
distinguish and diminish access to resources.
―Intersectionality,‖ now a bit frayed as a theoretical frame,
is nonetheless still a useful call in rights-oriented policy work,
as using it can move advocates away from isolating or decontextualizing solutions for silo-ed groups of victims and
toward more structural and sustainable change, benefiting a
greater diversity of persons.58 By interrogating the dynamics of
gender sectarianism in this Essay,59 I hope to be part of a
conversation and a practice that begins identifying and
challenging these divisions from within different gender teams.
Based on the way work that gender is also doing in ‗covering‘
for sexuality, I think we must also challenge rights work on
gender and sexuality to work more carefully with terms and
assumptions around gender and sexuality.
Just as we must assure ourselves that we all benefit from
justice across race, ethnicity, religion, age, and nation, I
suspect fundamentally we may also have to reassure ourselves
that we all benefit from liberation from gender binaries and
sexual repressions.
This work to reflect and think critically within advocacy
groups is important, because I think we can take as a given
that the powers that oppose the capacious analytic tools of
gender understand the stakes of the gender shifts. If we take

58. An Intersectional approach ―analyz[es] the disempowerment of
marginalized women [by] attempts to capture the consequences of the
interaction between two or more forms of subordination. It addresses the
manner in which racism, patriarchy, class oppression and other
discriminatory systems create inequalities that structure the relative
positions of women, races, ethnicities, classes, and the like. Moreover,
intersectionality addresses the way that specific acts and policies operate
together to create further disempowerment. Background Briefing on
Intersectionality,
WORKING GROUP ON WOMEN
& HUM. RTS.,
http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/bkgdbrfintersec.html
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2011).
59. This word is borrowed from a conversation with Carole Vance on the
day of the Symposium. Thanks to her for helping with this insight.
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the optimistic mode, that advocates do indeed seek gender
equality for a diverse ―all,‖ I think we benefit by paying
attention to the tension playing out within gender advocacy, in
that we might better understand the political stakes of not
recognizing the links between the issues of gender nonconformity in any territory. As Mary Anne Case‘s remarks in
the Symposium60 point out, the Vatican has figured out that
homosexuality and abortion, access to condoms for married
women and men having sex with men are conjoined politically
and ideologically as issues of gender and sexual nonconformity, why can‘t we?
Equally important, however, I hope this exposé ties back to
the optimistic call of the original questions for this panel: what
are the possibilities for the future? To answer this I turn again
to the works of Adam Phillips and his approach to uncertainty
as a form of maturity, and move beyond the questions about
flirting with which I began the Essay. Looking to end the fight
over gender, I think we need to consider how we proceed when
we recognize that we are in a place that Phillips terms ―the
struggle between the commonsense struggle for survival and a
struggle for the survival of the imaginative vision.‖61
If there is an interest in challenging the current bifurcated
and reified gender story being told on all sides, in creating
space within rights advocacy to use gender in a capacious yet
penetrating tool of analysis, then we have to develop a new way
of working with, and flirting with, gender.

60. After Gender? Examining International Justice Enterprises, PACE L.
SCH.
(Nov.
12,
2010),
http://streamingmedia.pace.edu/edmedia/PLRSymposium11-12-10.wmv.
61. ADAM PHILLIPS, THE BEAST IN THE NURSERY: ON CURIOSITY AND
OTHER APPETITES (1998). Phillips finishes his thought by reference to ―the
wish, and whatever comes to meet it,‖ suggesting we are indeed able to call
up new futures.
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